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Abstract 
The article critically examines the democratic possibilities of technological innovations associated 
with Web 2.0 tools and in this context it address the first and second ‘waves’ of academic debates 
concerning the social media and the public sphere in the networked society. It argues that the initial 
optimism associated with a virtual public sphere has been replaced by doubts about whether this 
model was appropriate for the development of democratic values. It assesses whether the information 
communications networks have constructed a more personalised form of politics and it is concerned 
with the application of the networked power relations with reference to grassroots or social 
revolutionary movements. New communications environments were seen to be instrumental in 
forging the conditions for the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions and the Turkish protests within Istanbul’s 
Taksim square during the summer of 2013. These Middle Eastern case examples are discussed along 
with the calls for political and economic change in Southern Europe within financially constrained 
countries of Spain and Greece. Based on such studies the article theorizes on the key question 
concerning whether the social media can contribute to democracy, revolution and expansion of the 
public sphere, or whether they remain instruments of control and power. 
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Introduction 
For many Internet advocates the social media 
provides an electronic agora to allow for 
alternative issues to be raised, framed and 
effectively debated.  It is contended citizens 
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may enjoy a real-time interactive access with 
one another to transmit ideas, by-pass 
authorities, challenge autocracies and affect 
greater forms of expression against state 
power. Thus, the social media allows for 
many-to-many or point-to point forms of 
communication. Most especially, online social 
networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn and 
Twitter, have facilitated opportunities for 
grassroots communication, deliberation and 
discussion.  
This paper will analyse the democratic 
possibilities of technological innovations 
associated with Web 2.0 tools. First, it will 
address the first and second ‘waves’ of 
academic debates concerning the social media 
and the public sphere in the networked society. 
The initial optimism associated with a virtual 
public sphere was replaced by doubts about 
whether this model was appropriate for the 
development of democratic values. 
Consequently, Manual Castells’ contention 
that the information communications networks 
have constructed a more personalised form of 
politics proved to be vital in the discussion of 
citizen participation. He suggests that 
grassroots networks have established social 
movements characterised by new types of 
solidarity, political resistance and the 
circumvention of national borders by 
facilitating ‘wider spaces’ of power in the 
global society.  
Second, these concerns led to attention 
being placed upon the application of the 
networked power relations with reference to 
grassroots or social revolutionary movements. 
For instance, new communications 
environment were seen to be instrumental in 
forging the conditions for the ‘Arab Spring’ 
revolutions within Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, 
along with the mobilization of other forms of 
opposition in Libya and Syria. Similar claims 
were made for the online mobilization of 
Iranian demonstrators in the Green Revolution 
in 2009 and the Turkish protests within 
Istanbul’s Taksim square during the summer 
of 2013. These Middle Eastern case examples 
will be discussed along with the calls for 
political and economic change in Southern 
Europe within financially constrained 
countries of Spain and Greece. 
Third, a debate has emerged about 
whether the social media are reconfiguring 
power relations in terms of economic, political 
and social organization. For instance, are ICTs 
more effective in mobilizing voices for protest 
rather than formulating sustainable democratic 
institutions and political change? How 
effective have social media been in mobilizing 
voices for protest? Have both autocratic and 
democratically elected executives remained 
vigilant in protecting their interests? Thus, this 
paper will theorize on the key question 
concerning whether the social media can 
contribute to democracy, revolution and 
expansion of the public sphere, or whether 
they remain instruments of control and power. 
 
The Democratic Values of the Internet: 
From the Dutiful Citizen to the Networked 
Individual 
In a first wave of enthusiasm for the political 
implications of the Internet, it was predicted 
that a digital democracy would emerge on the 
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lines of an electronic agora or public sphere. 
This model followed Jürgen Habermas’ 
critique concerning the rise of an organic 
public sphere which accompanied the 
democratic dissemination of information in the 
newspapers which emerged in the eighteenth 
century. He argued that the public sphere (the 
space between the state and the public in 
which mass communications operated) had 
demonstrated how private expressions could 
be transformed into public opinions. Through 
a range of ‘rational’ discourses within the 
public arena, the media expedited a process 
wherein private citizens debated ideas so that 
collective decision-making could occur and 
tyrannical political power might be challenged. 
Consequently, the hierarchical relations 
between political elites and the masses were 
broken down: The economic independence 
provided by private property, the critical 
reflection fostered by letters and novels, the 
flowering of discussion in coffee houses and 
salons and, above all, the emergence of an 
independent, market-based press, created a 
new public engaged in critical political 
discussion. From this was forged by a reason 
based consensus which shaped the direction of 
the state (Curran and Gurevitch, 1992: 83). 
With reference to Habermas’s deliberative 
arguments, it was predicted that the growth of 
Internet interactivity and decentralisation of 
power relations would allow for a rational and 
informed debate. For instance, Wired 
Magazine’s media correspondent Jon Katz 
compared the burgeoning ‘net’ to the 
eighteenth century pamphleteers of the 
American Revolution (Katz, 1995). It was 
argued that as the Internet was a global 
medium that digital citizens would not only be 
able to express their individual ideas but 
would create a diverse and cohesive virtual 
community to facilitate agency and reform 
(Wheeler, 1997: 224).  
However, this wave of optimism was 
quickly replaced by more critical accounts 
which suggested that the Internet was 
conditioned by prevailing economic, social 
and political interests (Street, 1996). Further, 
questions emerged about the value of the 
virtual democracy as post-modernist 
perspectives about the ‘simulacrum’ or the 
implosion between subjective and objective 
meaning meant that the social media became 
seen as a means of narcissistic self-interest 
rather than collective activity. Other cultural 
critiques emerged about the value of the public 
sphere model as a means to engage the wider 
political community (see Iosifidis and 
Wheeler, forthcoming). It was contended that 
gender and race issues had not been addressed 
as the ‘rational’ communications within the 
multi-media favoured white, wealthy males to 
the exclusion of others (Loader and Mercea, 
2011: 758). It was further argued that the 
democratising and empowering function of the 
Internet is being exaggerated and that Public 
Service Media are capable of developing more 
inclusive social frameworks than online 
providers (Iosifidis, 2011).  
 In spite of these difficulties, a new 
wave of social and political theories emerged 
in the wake of the development of Web 2.0 
platforms. This second generation of writing 
about Internet democracy has been 
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distinguished by the displacement of the public 
sphere model with a networked citizen 
perspective. Instead of Habermasian 
concomitants from dutiful citizens, the 
‘drivers’ of democratic innovation have been 
the networks of everyday citizens who are 
engaged in lifestyle politics (Bennett 2003; 
Dahlgren 2009; Papacharissi 2010).In tandem, 
it has been argued that alternative forms of 
cognitive behaviour are occurring as new 
generations engage with the software 
technologies of the social media. For instance, 
Margaret Wertheim has argued that 
cyberspace may construct an expansive sense 
of the ‘self’ which becomes ‘almost like a 
fluid, leaking out around us all the time and 
joining each of us into a vast ocean or web of 
relationships with other leaky selves’ 
(Wertheim, 1999). Therefore, the private 
identities of autonomous citizens may be 
employed to advance a multitude of publicly 
realised political ideas and values (Loader and 
Mercea, 2011: 759). In his empirical study of 
Catalonian Internet users, Manuel Castells 
contended that personal autonomy is enhanced 
by social media usage in relation to societal 
rules and institutional power (Castells, 2007). 
He argues that these actors will engage in 
collective activity within the networked 
society to facilitate a reconfiguration of 
political solidarity through the dissemination 
of knowledge, the representation of alternative 
forms of social capital and the construction of 
grassroots engagement: Enthusiastic 
networked individuals are transformed into a 
conscious, collective actor. Thus social change 
results from communicative action that 
involves connection between networks ... from 
a communicative environment through 
communications networks. The technology 
and morphology of these communications 
networks shapes the process of mobilisation, 
and thus social change, both as a process and 
an outcome (Castells: 2012: 219-20). 
 
The Networked Society and social 
revolutions 
From this perspective, the network society is 
constituted from autonomous individuals who 
connect with one another in an ever opening 
space within politics. Consequently, non-
traditional political actors have affected new 
forms of consciousness through blogs, tweets, 
Facebook activities and online petitions. 
Therefore, the virtual technology can facilitate 
a more ‘virtuous’ citizenship to reconnect the 
public with the democratic process to allow for 
‘civic commons’ to emerge (Putnam, 2000; 
Chadwick, 2006: 25). In some respects, this 
transformation reflects the pluralism in 
governmental decision-making that Robert 
Dahl identified when he claimed that there 
would be a diffusion of centralised power 
relations (Dahl, 1961). Howeve, for Castells 
power:  Is no longer concentrated in 
institutions (the state), organizations (capitalist 
firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate 
media, churches). It is diffused in global 
networks of wealth, power, information and 
images, which circulate and transmute in a 
system of variable geometry and 
dematerialised geography (Castells, 2006: 
359). These concerns about the location of 
power have led to questions about how such 
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forms of representation have segued into the 
contested principles of late modernity or post-
democratic behaviour (Crouch, 2004). These 
ideas are comparable with but contest the 
notion of post-modernism, in that they suggest 
a self-referring modernism and fragmentation 
in which ‘social practices are constantly 
examined and reformed in the light of 
incoming information about those very 
practices, thus constitutively altering their 
character’ (Giddens, 1991: 38). In terms of 
post-democratic activity, late modernists 
contend such changes reflect a replacement of 
hierarchies with networks; the rise of 
discursive network governance, the expansion 
of the social media and a constantly reformed 
version of contemporary democracy (Marsh 
et.al, 2010: 326).  
Clay Shirky has argued that within the 
networked society it becomes ‘ridiculously 
easy’ to break down the barriers which have 
previously closed off collective action (Shirky, 
2009). Instead, the social media encourages 
the formation of self-directed open source or 
hacking groups to engage in their activities 
and to gather together. Therefore, the old 
hierarchies of repression, corporate interest 
and hermetically sealed ideologies are 
removed to allow for an alternative expression 
of grassroots political behaviour. Such a 
dispersal of power means that cyberspace will 
create a public space which ultimately 
becomes a political space wherein ‘sovereign 
assemblies to meet and ... recover their rights 
of representation, which have been captured in 
political institutions predominantly tailored for 
the convenience of the dominant interests’ 
(Castells, 2012: 11).  Accordingly, ICT 
networks will facilitate networked publics to 
construct their values, meaning and identity to 
affect new forms of solidarity. The Internet 
makes it easier to organize and agitate as 
people can participate in reality TV votes, or 
support a petition within the click of a mouse, 
or even force out undemocratic governments. 
This had led to the formation of networked 
social movements which have largely ignored 
the political elite, distrusted the established 
media, and have rejected any leadership, 
hierarchy or formal organisation, by using 
open forums for collective debate and social 
dialogue. This has been reflected in a ‘division 
of labour’ within activism that has been 
defined by the available social media 
platforms to build political consciousness: If 
you look at the full suite of information tools 
that were employed to spread the revolutions 
of 2009-11, it goes like this: Facebook is used 
to form groups, covert and overt --- in order to 
establish those strong and flexible connections. 
Twitter is used for real-time organization and 
news dissemination, bypassing the 
cumbersome ‘newsgathering’ operations of the 
mainstream media. YouTube and the Twitter-
linked photographic sites ---Yfrog, Flickr and 
Twitpic --- are used to provide instant 
evidence of the claims being made. Link-
shorteners like bit.ly are used to disseminate 
key articles via Twitter (Mason, 2012: 75). 
In turn, in a variation of the Canadian 
philosopher Marshall McLuhan’s adage that 
the ‘medium is the message’, Castells 
theorizes that the social media’s power lies in 
the images of representation that are produced 
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by people’s consciousness (Castells, 2012). 
This understanding of the cognitive power of 
the social media accords with Lee Salter’s 
(2003) arguments that the Internet is a novel 
technological asset for democratic 
communications ‘because of its decentred, 
textual communications system, with content 
most often provided by users’ (Fenton, 2011: 
40 ). Informal New Social Movements 
(NSMs) have emerged from the de-alignment 
of partisan allegiances and networks of action. 
These NSMs may contradict the previous 
dominant logics, to affect a new social 
structure (a network society), a new economy 
(a global informational economy) and anew 
culture (a culture of 'real virtuality'): The 
technological and inter-personal revolutions of 
the early twenty- first century  [mean] ... it 
[is] now possible to conceive of living this 
‘emancipated’ life as a fully connected 
‘species-being’ on the terrain of capitalism 
itself --- indeed on the terrain of a highly 
marketized form of capitalism (Mason, 2012: 
143). Consequently, Web 2.0 has been the 
mechanism to inform new types of political 
resistance and has been the means through 
which revolts have occurred in western 
democracies, illiberal societies and against 
autocratic regimes. These changes have 
resulted from the deployment of digital 
communications within workplace and their 
growth throughout the publics’ social lives. 
Due to the unprecedented exponential take up 
of these social media tools by online 
participants, these trends enhanced individual 
and collective behaviour to confirm the 
revolutionary potential of the new 
technologies, thereby expanding political 
consciousness and magnifying ‘the crucial 
driver of all revolutions --- the perceived 
difference between what could be and what is’ 
(Mason, 2012 : 85). 
 
The Social Media and Political Movements: 
Opportunities and Repression in Iran and 
Turkey 
As the networked population has gained a 
greater access to information, social 
movements have spread across the Arab world 
and have often been confronted with violent 
repression. For instance, the protests 
associated with the Iranian ‘Green Revolution’ 
against the disputed outcome of the 2009 
General Election, in which President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad controversially won, 
were facilitated through Facebook and Twitter. 
According to Annabelle Sreberny and Gholam 
Khiabany: Many Iranians on Facebook 
changed their profile picture to a green square 
that included the text ‘where is my vote’, 
while many non-Iranians tweaked the icon to 
‘where is their vote.’ Facebook turned green. It 
became a space for posting video ... articles ... 
photographs that had been sent by mobile or e-
mail attachment from people in Iran. Facebook 
became an enormous distribution site of new 
or recycled materials (Sreberny and Khiabany, 
2010: 173). Simultaneously, Iranian activists 
used Twitter to provide real-time updates of 
the events. Therefore, an iconic video of a 
group of protesters marching down Tehran’s 
Valiasr Street shouting, ‘Mousavi, take back 
my vote!’ went viral when attached to the 
micro-blogging site (Mason, 2012: 34). 
Global Media Journal                                                                  ISSN: 1550-7521                                        
Volume 13 Issue 25 
7 
 
Another YouTube video showed what 
followed as the Iraqi riot police baton charged 
the unarmed crowd. This frightening material 
was attached to blogs, Facebook and Twitter 
sites to demonstrate the terror and chaos which 
accompanied the brutal subjugation of the 
political demonstrations. In addition, the 
protesters employed a range of online 
‘mashups’ to achieve a variety of ranges of 
expression. These social media representations 
reflected a new form of political creativity 
which expressed an underlying solidarity to 
the cause. As a consequence, they 
demonstrated a politics of attraction as 
protestors could articulate their sympathy one 
another and engage in further activities to 
propagate their messages. 
In response, the Iranian government 
censored the social media by filtering the 
websites and taking them down as a result of 
the protests. However, ‘Freegate’ an anti-
censorship software developed by the Global 
Internet Freedom Consortium, was employed 
to a limited degree to offset the state controls. 
At an international level, western hackers kept 
the online channels open in spite of the Iranian 
regime’s attempts to close them down. Further, 
as the Iranian authorities cracked down on  
traditional media outlets, international news 
agencies employed user-generated content  
and the ‘momentum of the protests fed off this 
cycle of guerrilla newsgathering, media 
amplification, censorship and renewed protest’ 
(Ibid.: 35). Ultimately, the Iranian protest 
would be lost, yet it provided: all the 
ingredients were present of the uprisings that 
would, eighteen months later, galvanise the 
Middle East and beyond: radicalized, secular-
leaning youth: a repressed workers’ movement 
with considerable social power; uncontrollable 
social media; the restive urban poor (Ibid: 37). 
 
Similar claims were made with regard to the 
online mobilization of the Turkish protesters 
who demonstrated in Istanbul’s Taksim Square 
during the summer of 2013 (Mason, 2013). 
The civil unrest began on 28 May 2013 in 
response to the violent eviction of peaceful 
protesters who were engaging in a sit-in 
against the urban re-development of Taksim 
Gezi Park. Video footage of the riot police’s 
excessive violence was posted online and this 
sparked a wider amount of unrest across 
Turkey. Subsequently, demonstrations and 
strikes were called in relation to a range of 
issues related to the freedom of the press, the 
rights of expression and assembly, and the 
Islamic Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan’s encroachment upon Turkey’s 
secularist traditions. 
On 1 June 2013, there was a 
restoration of the sit-in when the police 
withdrew from Taksim Square wherein the 
protesters lived in tents, organized a library 
and a medical centre, distributed food banks 
and established their own media centre. As 
Turkish broadcasters imposed a news 
blackout, the camp organizers used Twitter 
and Facebook to provide updates from the 
occupied Gezi Park, distributed photos on 
Flickr and Tumblr and uploaded videos onto 
YouTube. The Twitterhashtag, 
“direngezipark,” was tweeted over 1.8 million 
times in three days. Invariably, the protesters 
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used smart phone handsets to live-stream 
video images of the protests (Social Media and 
Participation Lab, 2013). In tandem, there 
were internationally re-tweeted messages of 
support for the demonstrations. For example, 
these included tweets from the Dutch 
footballer Wesley Sneijder, who was playing 
for the Istanbul football club Galatasaray 
(Hutchinson, 2013). However, the Gezi Park 
demonstration was cleared by riot police on 
the 15 June 2013. Consequently, videos and 
photos were uploaded onto social media sites 
covering the brutal deployment of tear gas 
canisters and water cannons used to disperse 
the protesters. Throughout the crisis Erdogan 
declared that the rioters were mere ‘looters’ 
who were using the social networks to 
undermine the legitimate government. He 
claimed that, ‘There is now a menace which is 
called Twitter ... The best examples of lies can 
be found there ...  To me, the social media is 
the worst menace to society’ (Letsch, 2013). 
After the ‘Turkish Spring’ Erdogan’s antipathy 
to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube hardened 
even more. In 2014, he was angered by the 
leak of damaging information gleaned from 
wire-taps on Twitter in time for the local 
spring elections. This led to the Turkish 
authorities temporarily closing down the 
micro-blogging site on 20 March 2014. This 
closure was later declared to be 
unconstitutional. However, Erdogan’s 
government also tried to find ways to close 
YouTube and Facebook. A former pro-
government columnist Nazli Ilicak described 
the restrictions as being akin to ‘a civil coup’: 
The disruption sparked a virtual 
uproar with many comparing Turkey to Iran 
and North Korea, where social media 
platforms are tightly controlled. There were 
also calls to take to the street to protest, 
although some users equally called for calm. 
Turkish internet users were quick to come up 
with their own ways to circumvent the block. 
The hashtag #TwitterisblockedinTurkey 
quickly moved among the top trending 
globally (Rawlinson, 2014). However, as Paul 
Mason has commented these autocratic 
controls have come at cost to the authorities as 
they have realized that the Internet ‘is a 
network of networks, containing non-
hierarchical pathways that simply do not allow 
you to switch part of it off ... (so) this is a 
signal moment [wherein] ... once-respected 
[statesmen have turned] into ... Canute-like 
[clowns]’ (Mason, 2014). Therefore, the 
dichotomy which exists between the 
imposition of state controls to censor and to 
propagandize their values against the tide of 
alternative positions associated with grassroots 
activism has remained evident throughout the 
Middle East. 
 
Social Media and Political Movements in 
the Mediterranean democracies of Spain 
and Greece 
While the 2000s saw an explosion of protest 
movements in authoritarian Arabic states, 
post-2011 witnessed uprisings in democratic 
European nations including the Spanish 
‘Indignados’ and the Greek ‘Aganaktismenoi’ 
(outraged). The demonstrations in Spain began 
on 15 May 2011 with an initial gathering in 
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more than 50 Spanish cities and a few days 
later (25 May) activists started demonstrating 
in major cities in Greece organized by the 
‘Direct Democracy Now!’ movement known 
as ‘Aganaktismenoi’ (the Indignant Citizens 
Movement). This unprecedented ‘protest 
movement domino’ had some similarities with 
the Middle East uprisings as Spanish and 
Greek demonstrators demanded a radical shift 
in politics. Indeed, they did not consider 
themselves to be represented by any of the 
traditional parties and opposed the policies 
adopted by their respective political elites. 
These case examples from Southern Europe 
were associated with calls for political and 
economic change in these financially 
constrained countries.  
However, the similarities stop there. 
While the social media networks have been 
crucial in both the Arab world and the 
Southern European region in mobilizing 
people there are major differences between 
western democracies and the repressive Arabic 
regimes. These differences are deeply rooted 
in the social and political realities, ranging 
from the different levels of freedom of 
expression, to cultural differences, to the 
degree of censorship, to the core role of 
religion, to women’s rights, and the different 
levels of access to education. It is not the 
intention of this paper to go through these 
differences in detail, but two basic 
observations can be made at this point.  
First, the Spanish and Greek uprisings 
followed the seismic economic crisis of 2008 
in the USA, which spread across the world and 
most especially to Southern Europe. It 
destabilized national economies and triggered 
political elites into introducing austerity 
measures. These refer to actions taken by 
governments to reduce their budget deficit 
using a combination of spending cuts and tax 
rises. Second, these movements were 
promoted and maintained through the use of 
social media exactly in the same way as the 
Arab uprisings. In today’s highly mediatized 
environment it was primarily social 
networking platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, rather than the traditional pro-
government media which mobilized people in 
times of economic crisis and kept them 
connected.  
Therefore, social media driven movements in 
both Spain and Greece stood against anti-
austerity measures adopted by the respective 
governments. At the time, Spain had the 
highest unemployment rate in Europe, 
reaching a Eurozone record of 21.3 per cent 
with the youth unemployment rate standing at 
43.5 per cent, the highest in the European 
Union (in February 2015 Greek youth 
unemployment at a rate of 50.1 per cent was 
the highest in the Eurozone area - see 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/indi
cators, accessed 13 May 2015). The anti-
austerity movement in Greece was provoked 
by then government plans to cut public 
spending and raise taxes in exchange for a 110 
billion Euro bail-out aimed at solving the 
Greek government debt crisis. 
Turning to Habermas’s notion of the public 
sphere, it could be argued that the social media 
have enabled people to take speedy and 
costless individual action. As common people 
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experienced a decline in their incomes and the 
traditional media typically labelled austerity 
policies as ‘unavoidable’, they saw that the 
social media offered them with an opportunity 
to raise their voices upon the streets. These 
ICT networks created a new sphere of ‘public 
authority’ wherein public opinion was 
simultaneously shaped both within national 
borders but also beyond them, providing 
access to a trans-national sphere of discourse 
made possible due to the global nature of the 
Internet. In times of deep economic crisis, 
Web 2.0 networks offered a unique 
opportunity to local citizens to shape their 
political views in the cyber space and translate 
them into action. Consequently, the German 
philosopher Habermas took an active role in 
the debate about the Spanish and the Greek 
economic crisis (and ultimately the European 
crisis). He not only condemned the parties for 
failing to provide a realistic, development-
oriented and citizen-friendly strategy to 
overcome the crisis but also blamed the EU for 
the problematic adaptation of the single 
currency and the pursuance of tough fiscal 
policies (see 
http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/article/124
2541-juergen-habermas-last-european). 
Could these arguments lie under the protests in 
Spain and Greece then? Is this systemic crisis 
lying under the protestors’ agenda? And how 
do the social media form the extended public 
sphere? In a 2006 article Habermas gave us a 
hint of his ideas on the matter: 
The internet has certainly reactivated 
the grassroots of an egalitarian public of 
writers and readers. However, computer 
mediated communication in the web can claim 
unequivocal democratic merits only for a 
special context: It can undermine the 
censorship of authoritarian regimes that try to 
control and repress public opinion. In the 
context of liberal regimes, the rise of millions 
of fragmented chat rooms across the world 
tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of 
large but politically focused mass audiences 
into a huge number of isolated issue publics. 
Within established national public spheres, the 
online debates of web users only promote 
political communication, when news groups 
crystallize around the focal points of the 
quality press, for example, national 
newspapers and political magazines 
(Habermas, 2006).  
The intellectual argument rising here 
originates from Marxism and Critical Theory 
(when referring to critical studies of digital 
media and the information society, the 
majority of scholars actually mean Marxist 
studies of the new media). It relates to the 
notion of mediatization (this paradigm 
contends that the media shapes and frames the 
processes and discourse of political 
communication as well as the society in which 
that communication takes place) and to the 
arguments on how the ‘media ways’ have 
colonized all aspects of our everyday lives, 
including politics and activism. Taking a 
critical political economy approach on the way 
social media is produced and distributed 
(Fuchs, 2009) the next section provides a 
critique of the social media and its democratic 
potential by highlighting the shortcomings that 
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the information networks present for uprisings 
and protest movements. 
 
A Critique of the Social Media --- 
individualism; unreliability, polarization 
and the reconfiguration of political power? 
Online social networking sites have been often 
perceived as revolutionary new media tools, 
because they allow greater citizen participation 
in the dissemination of information and 
creation of content. The networked population 
is gaining greater access to information, 
enhanced opportunities to engage in public 
speech, and an ability to undertake collective 
action. However, as Zygmunt Bauman has 
argued that such forms of ‘liquid modernism’ 
in which individualist practices of social 
behaviour create new opportunities for the 
self-realization of participation may also 
exacerbate uncertainties in the human 
condition. Most notably, the new patterns of 
social activity have paradoxically facilitated an 
increasing fluidity in people’s behaviour while 
producing existential fears over being 
imprisoned by such freedoms (Bauman, 2000: 
8). 
Principally, the Marxist Hypermedia 
scholars Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron 
have argued that the ‘Californian Ideology’ 
which had emerged from the technophiles 
within Silicon Valley encompassed a range of 
neo-liberal economic principles forged by 
individualistic and deregulated forms of free-
market enterprise (Barbrook and Cameron, 
1996). In effect, such techno-populist 
libertarianism constructed a labour aristocracy 
or ‘virtual class’ who benefitted from an 
inequitable distribution of resources as there 
was  a commodification of individual thought 
through a supply-side market transaction 
between entertainment providers and users 
(Wheeler, 1998; 228-9). According to 
Barbrook and Cameron this meant: Despite its 
radical rhetoric, the Californian Ideology is 
ultimately pessimistic about fundamental 
social change. ... The social liberalism of New 
Left and the economic liberalism of New 
Right have converged into an ambiguous 
dream of a hi-tech ... version of the plantation 
economy of the Old [American] South. 
Reflecting its deep ambiguity, the Californian 
Ideology’s technological determinism is not 
simply optimistic and emancipatory. It is 
simultaneously a deeply pessimistic and 
repressive vision of the future (Barbrook and 
Cameron, 1996: 14). These concerns underpin 
John Keane’s analysis of what he describes as 
the ‘Decadent Media.’  Public expression has 
been restricted into individual discourses and 
the concentration of power within the new 
media has undermined the substance of 
democratic behaviour. Therefore, Keane 
identifies the disparities which exist between 
the normative expectations associated with 
‘media abundance’ such openness, plurality, 
inclusion and equality with a more tarnished 
reality in which the social media  promote the 
intolerance of opinions, restrict the scrutiny of 
power and propagate an acceptance of the way 
things are heading. In this respect, Keane 
contends that elite business and state power 
has been enhanced by data collection, 
censorship, spin and new mechanisms of 
surveillance (Keane, 2013): Message-saturated 
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societies can and do have effects that are 
harmful for democracy. Some of them are 
easily spotted. In some quarters, most 
obviously, media saturation triggers citizens’ 
inattention to events. While they are expected 
as good citizens to keep their eyes on public 
affairs, to take an interest in the world beyond 
their immediate household and 
neighbourhood, more than a few find it ever 
harder to pay attention to the media’s vast 
outpourings. Profusion breeds confusion 
(Keane, 2010).  In trying to comprehend the 
sheer mass of information, users are further 
confronted by the fact that much of the 
Internet’s content is unreliable. As a 
widespread source of information the Internet 
should provide reliable, authentic and up-to-
date information, but user generated content 
and blogs, in particular, are often defined as 
unreliable sources, containing personal and 
one-sided opinions. It is fair to say that 
common sense (house rules) and common 
decency should be the rule, or acceptable 
practice, when posting materials on the 
Internet, but as this is largely a self-regulated 
area, reaction comes only when someone 
complains. There is clearly a need for a better 
balance enforcing appropriate online 
behaviour, the assignment of liability, and 
protecting freedom of speech. Frankly 
providing an informed (and safe) online 
experience is important both for users and 
businesses.  
Dahlberg (2007) has found that the online 
debate is polarized and there is generally a 
lack of listening to others. He pointed out that 
the Internet and social media fail to adequately 
consider the asymmetries of power through 
which deliberation and consensus are 
achieved, the inter-subjective basis of 
meaning, the centrality of respect for 
difference in democracy, and the democratic 
role of ‘like-minded’ deliberative groups. 
What is often absent in online deliberations is 
a consensus-based, justified and rational 
decision, let alone that not everyone affected 
by that decision is included. The ‘echo-
chamber’ (Sunstein, 2007) effects of the social 
media mean that agreements becomes 
impossible, issues become ‘flamed’ and 
decision-making become subjected to the 
greater polarization of opinion: A political 
process in which like-minded people talk 
primarily to one another poses a great danger 
for the future of a democracy. This kind of 
process can lead to unwarrantedextremism. 
When various groups move in opposite 
directions to extreme positions, confusion, 
confrontation, accusation, and sometimes even 
violence may be the ultimate result (Sunstein, 
2001: 7). Therefore, it has been asked whether 
the Internet rather than promoting change has 
reinforced the social institutions of economic, 
political and social power. Instead of the 
networked society constructing opportunities 
for change and reform, Couldry has argued 
that the existing power relations have 
remained firmly in place. First, he questions 
whether the power held within the networks 
can transform or affect other forms of power 
which exist outside of the network? Secondly, 
that the network analysis fails to address the 
matters of context and resources which are 
necessary for any sustainable development of 
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political agency.  Third, and most 
fundamentally, that economic, military and 
legal authority cannot be reduced to network 
operations. Instead, state and corporate interest 
retain their central functions in society and 
combine to undermine individual autonomy 
and agency (Couldry, 2012: 116-8). 
In this context, Fenton contends that the 
networked forms of communications cannot 
really challenge the multi-media 
concentrations of capital which define the 
political economy of the Internet (Fenton, 
2012).  She argues that political solidarity is 
shaped by the material experience of labour 
relations, struggles and conflicts rooted in the 
exploitation of labour by the pursuit of capital. 
Thus, solidarity is a modernist concept based 
on the principles of a political economic order 
and workers remain exploited by the 
hegemonic forces of capital. Therefore, for 
grassroots solidarity to be effective it is 
necessary to reorganize global capitalist 
relations so that they are not monolithic forces 
of impenetrable domination (Fenton, 2011: 
53). This means that the commercial power of 
the Internet needs to be understood as a 
significant barrier towards the proletariat’s 
political expression and that for collective 
identities to emerge that it must be realized: 
While it is true that social media provide a 
pleasurable means of self-expression and 
social connection, enable people to answer 
back to the citadels of media power and in 
certain situations ... may support the creation 
of radical counter-public ... Social media are 
more often about individual than collective 
emancipation, about presenting self 
(frequently in consumerist ... terms) rather 
than changing society, about entertainment and 
leisure rather than political communication ... 
and about social agendas shaped by elites and 
corporate power rather than a radical 
alternative (Curran, Freedman and Fenton, 
2012: 180). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has considered the implications 
concerning the democratic potential of the 
social media in forming new types of power 
relations, determining alternative social 
movements and affecting changes in political 
consciousness. Web 2.0 tools have been seen 
to advance a greater plurality of expression 
and to allow for the construction of horizontal 
networks of communication. According to 
Castells, these information networks represent 
the diffusion of centralised power and the 
democratisation of political expression 
(Castells, 2012). In this respect, the process is 
as important as the outcome as the social 
media allow for a multi-dimensional range of 
opinions and values to be accumulated to 
shape political behaviour and outcomes. 
 Within this context, it is claimed that 
the social media facilitate the potential power 
of revolutionary groups and forces. Therefore, 
in Western societies and Global Southern 
states, there have been a range of examples in 
which populist uprisings and alternative voices 
have been raised.  Web 2.0 tools have allowed 
social movements to respond to public 
grievances and for the mobilisation of 
oppositional forces. As there was a major take-
up of broadband Internet and mobile telephony 
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services within Iran and Turkey, there were 
greater degrees of political engagement in 
these states. Yet the opportunities for the free 
forms of online expression have been qualified 
by retrogressive laws and censorship. In 
response to grassroots protest movements both 
the Iranian and Turkish authorities’ utilized 
repressive measures to stem the flow of 
Internet traffic to temporally close down the 
social networks.  Such concerns have led to a 
major debate about whether the social media 
could overcome the perceived democratic 
deficits within these societies. 
The Spanish (Indignatos) and Greek 
(Aganaktismenoi) movements have 
demonstrated how the social media could be 
utilized to mobilize the public to take to the 
streets against the imposition of tough 
austerity measures. The Spanish case is 
important as Spain’s economy is the fourth 
largest in the Eurozone area (based on nominal 
GDP statistics) and its poor performance, 
alongside social upheavals due to high 
unemployment, not only reflects badly on the 
country but also the whole region. The Greek 
case is unique as Greece appears to have been 
the ‘weakest link’ of a badly manufactured 
Eurozone project, ready to break and produce 
financial chaos in the global markets. This has 
produced a deep crisis in Europe with 
unpredictable economic and indeed social and 
political effects. These cases help us to 
understand how the use of social media 
revolutionised and expanded the public sphere 
to contribute to people’s political awakening in 
Southern Europe. However, it remains to be 
seen whether these movements will have 
lasting effects in terms of political change and 
a shift in economic direction. In particular, the 
questions of power and responsibility which 
have permeated the traditional media remain 
pertinent with regard to the democratic 
potentials (or not) of the social media. 
Questions abound concerning individualistic 
forms of participation; the trivialisation of 
information, the inability to distinguish 
between ‘real’ and ‘virtual communications 
and the saturation of information which has 
been endemic in an over-abundant social 
media.  Effectively, can people make sense of 
the ranges of information they receive? 
Further, have the echo-chamber effects of a 
pluralistic, but highly individualist discourse, 
led to a stratified and polarized rather than 
collective form of political activity?  More 
instrumentalist critiques have questioned the 
economic, political and social constraints that 
continue to abound within cyberspace and 
suggest that communications networks 
reinforce rather than challenge the institutions 
of capitalism. In particular, Fenton  argues that 
technological utopianism masks the fact that 
‘the Internet does not transcend global 
capitalism but is deeply involved with it by 
virtue of the ... discourses of capitalism ... in 
which people who use it are drenched in’ 
(Fenton, 2012: 124). Therefore, the democratic 
potential of the social media remains 
contested. Consequently, it remains to be seen 
whether the social network sites will prove to 
be beneficial or detrimental for the extension 
of citizens’ democratic rights. 
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